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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the findings by the Wade Court of the hazards to fairness inherent in all
identification procedures. This decision, therefore, is a departure from
those principles that motivated the Court in Wade. Kirby has, in effect,
removed the responsibility for the fairness of a particular pretrial con-
frontation from the judicial arena and placed it with the other branches
of government. It is questionable whether such a move is constitutionally
mandated in light of past decisions extending the right to counsel.
Howell K. Rosenberg
INJUNCTIONS - SECTION ONE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871
Is AN "EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED" EXCEPTION TO THE FEDERAL ANTI-
INJUNCTION STATUTE.
Mitchum v. Foster (U.S. 1972)
A prosecuting attorney for a Florida county brought suit in a state
court, pursuant to Florida's general nuisance statutes, to close appellant's
bookstore.' Finding that certain books offered for sale at the store were
obscene, 2 the court issued an interlocutory order enjoining the store's
continued operation.
While review of the interlocutory order and related contempt pro-
ceedings was pending in the state courts, appellant filed a complaint in a
federal district court. Relying upon section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871,- he sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the state court
proceedings, asserting that Florida laws were being unconstitutionally
applied so as to cause him great and irreparable harm.4 He alleged that
1. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.05, 823.05 (1961).
2. The Florida statutes provide a test for determining obscenity:
* ' * Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest.
Id. § 847.011(10).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
4. The jurisdiction of the federal district court was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1970) which provides:
[The district courts have jurisdiction to] redress the deprivation under color
of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States.
This statute differs from the general federal question provision, id. § 1331,
in that it does not require the allegation of a minimum amount in controversy (now
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the injunction against the operation of his bookstore was depriving him
of his first and fourteenth amendment rights.5 A three-judge court heard
the complaint6 and refused to enjoin the proceedings in the Florida courts,
holding that the injunctive relief sought was barred by the federal anti-
injunction statute7 which prohibits a federal court from enjoining pro-
ceedings8 in a state court except in three situations. The court held that
the relief did not fall within any of these exceptions, i.e., it was neither
"expressly authorized" by an act of Congress, nor "necessary in aid of"
its jurisdiction, nor necessary to "protect or effectuate" its judgments.9
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
three-judge court, holding that the Civil Rights Act was an act of
Congress which fell within the "expressly authorized" exception to the
-federal anti-injunction statute. The Court remanded the case to the district
court, noting that it did not "question or qualify in any way the principles
of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when
asked to enjoin a state court proceeding." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 243 (1972).
The original anti-injunction statute was enacted by Congress in 1793.10
It provided without qualification that "[no] writ of injunction [shall] be
granted [by any federal court] to stay proceedings in any court of a state."
$10,000) to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Justice Stone, in a con-
curring opinion to Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 529-32 (1939), indicated that section
1343(3) did not apply to "proprietary" rights, but only to personal rights. Otherwise,
he asserted the minimum amount in controversy requirement of section 1331 would be
rendered superfluous. However, the Court has recently abrogated this distinction
between personal and proprietary rights. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S.
538, 542-52 (1972). The more crucial distinction between section 1343(3) and section
1331 is that the former is applicable only in cases involving state action and thereby
is ineffective against any federal deprivation of civil rights. Nevertheless, the Civil
Rights Act and section 1343(3) are now considered to be coextensive in application.
5. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 227 (1972).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) provides that an injunction against the enforcement
of a state statute on the ground of its unconstitutionality may not be granted except
by a district court composed of three judges. Id. § 2284 provides the rules for the
composition and procedure of such a court.
7. Id. § 2283. For the actual language of the statute, see text accompanying
note 29 infra.
8. The state court order being challenged was clearly a "proceeding" within
the scope of the anti-injunction statute:
[The term "proceedings" includes] all steps taken or which may be taken in the
state court or by its officers from the institution to the close of the final process.
It applies to appellate as well as to original proceedings .... [And it] applies
alike to action by the court and by its ministerial officers . . . [and] to any
proceeding supplemental or ancillary taken with a view to making the suit or
judgment effective. The prohibition is applicable whether such supplementary
or ancillary proceeding is taken in the court which rendered the judgment or
in some other.
Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935).
The prohibitions against federal intervention, however, do not apply to a pro-
ceeding which is merely threatened. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-85
(1965). Nor do they apply to a pre-judgment garnishment levied without participation
of a court. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552-56 (1972).
9. Mitchum v. Foster, 315 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
10. The prohibition first appeared in section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1793. Act
of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335. The congressional intent motivating its
enactment is obscure since there is no record of the debates preceding its adoption.
justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314
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Congress amended the statute in 1875 to permit a federal court to stay
proceedings which interfered with the administration of a federal bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 1 The statute was adopted in its present form in 1948
when Title 28 of the United States Code was enacted.'
2
The Court initially construed the statute as an unqualified restraint on
the equity powers of the federal courts.' 3 In 1874, however, the Court
modified its approach in French v. Hay,14 in which a federal court, which
had obtained jurisdiction of a controversy pursuant to the provisions of a
federal removal statute, was sustained in enjoining proceedings in a state
court which were related to the same controversy. Apparently, the Court's
rationale was that the removal act qualified pro tanto the anti-injunction
statute. 15
The Court thereafter found several other acts of Congress to contain
pro tanto qualifications to the anti-injunction statute. In addition to the
bankruptcy exception explicitly recognized by Congress in 1875'6 and the
legislation providing for the removal of litigation from state to federal
courts, 17 the Court in Mitchurn v. Foster8 noted that there were at least
five other federal statutes which embodied qualifications to the anti-in-
junction statute. These exceptions were found in legislation limiting the
liability of shipowners, 19 providing for federal interpleader actions, 20 con-
U.S. 118, 130-32 (1941), stated that it was likely that the provision reflected Congress'
"prevailing prejudice against equity jurisdiction." There seems to have been a desire
to restrict the power of courts of equity to withdraw the decision of actions at law
from the jury.
11. Rev. Stat. § 720 (1873).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). See text accompanying note 29 infra.
13. In Diggs v. Wolcott, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1804), the Court held that a
federal court was without power to enjoin a state court proceeding. However, the
anti-injunction provision was not mentioned in the opinion. In Peck v. Jenness, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 612, 625 (1849), the Court again denied a stay of state court pro-
ceedings but relied upon the provision.
14. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250, 253 (1874). French had obtained a judgment against
Hay in a Virginia court. Hay removed the case to a federal court pursuant to a
federal removal statute. French then tried to sue on the Virginia judgment in a
Pennsylvania court. The Supreme Court upheld an injunction by the federal court
against the proceedings in the Pennsylvania court. Id.
15. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 133 (1941).
16. Rev. Stat. § 720 (1873). Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 234 (1972).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1970) provides that once a copy of a removal petition
is filed with the clerk of a state court, the state court "shall proceed no further unless
and until the case is remanded." See note 14 supra. See also Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 133 (1941) (dictum).
18. 407 U.S. 225, 234 (1972).
19. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) provides that once a shipowner has deposited with a
federal court an amount equal to the value of his interest in a ship, "all claims and
proceedings with respect to the matter in question shall cease." In Providence &
N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883), the Court held that a state
court proceeding could not continue once a shipowner had complied with the statute's
provisions. Id. at 599-601. The Court also indicated that this provision would
authorize an injunction against a state court proceeding. Id.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970) provides:
In any civil action of interpleader . . . a district court may . . . enter its order
restraining [all claimants] from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any
State or United States court affecting the property, instrument or obligation in-
volved in the interpleader action.
In Treines v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 74 (1939), the Court held that this
provision authorized a federal court to enjoin a state court proceeding.
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ferring federal jurisdiction over farm mortgages, 21 governing federal habeas
corpus proceedings, 22 and providing for control of prices.
23
In addition to these statutory qualifications, the Court also deline-
ated certain "implied" exceptions to the prohibition of the anti-injunction
statute. One such exception was the "in rem" exception which permitted
a federal court to enjoin a subsequent state court proceeding that interfered
with its control of a res over which it had first obtained jurisdiction.
2 4
A second was the "relitigation" exception which enabled a federal court
to enjoin the relitigation in a state court of issues which it had itself
already decided and which were res judicata between the parties to the
state proceedings.25 A third exception has been recognized more recently -
subsequent to the revision of the anti-injunction statute in 1948 - per-
mitting a federal court to enjoin proceedings in a state court when the
petitioner in the federal court is the United States or a federal agency
asserting "superior federal interests.
'2
21. 11 U.S.C. § 203(s) (2) (1940) provides that in all situations to which it is
applicable a federal court shall "stay all judicial or official proceedings in any court."
In Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940), the Court held that once a petition was
filed with a bankruptcy court pursuant to the statute, a state court was without juris-
diction to conduct a foreclosure proceeding.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (1970) provides that a federal court before which a habeas
corpus proceeding is pending may "stay any proceeding against the person detained
in State court . . . for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding." In
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1886), the Court indicated that this provision
would authorize an injunction against a state court proceeding.
23. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 33
(expired 1947), provided that the Price Administrator could request a district court
to enjoin acts that threatened to violate the Act. In Porter v. Dicken, 328 U.S. 252,
255 (1946), the Court held that this provision authorized an injunction against state
court proceedings at the request of the Administrator.
24. See Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860), in which a Massa-
chusetts sheriff replevied certain railroad cars which a federal marshal had previously
attached pursuant to a mesne process of a federal court. The Supreme Court held
that the Massachusetts court erroneously proceeded to judgment in the replevin action
since the marshal had held the cars under authority of a federal court. The Court
held that the court - whether federal or state - which first takes possession of a
res withdraws it from the reach of the others.
25. In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921), the
Court held that a federal district court could enjoin members of a class bound by a
decree which it had rendered from relitigation in a state court of issues settled by
that decree.
26. In Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957), the Court
held the prohibitions of the anti-injunction statute inapplicable when the United States
was the party seeking a stay of state court proceedings. The Court admitted the
absence of express statutory language or legislative history supporting such a con-
struction of the statute but stated:
There is, however, a persuasive reason why the federal court's power to stay
state court proceedings might have been restricted when a private party was
seeking the stay but not when the United States was seeking similar relief. The
statute is designed to prevent conflict between federal and state courts. This
policy is much more compelling when it is the litigation of private parties which
threatens to draw the two judicial systems into conflict than when it is the United
States which seeks to prevent threatened irreparable injury to a national interest.
The frustration of superior federal interests that would ensue from precluding
the Federal Government from obtaining a stay of state court proceedings except
under the severe restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 would be so great that we
4
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In 1941, the Court, in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,2'7 re-
evaluated its approach to the anti-injunction statute and expressly dis-
avowed the relitigation exception. The opinion indicated that the Court
would be slow to carve out new exceptions to the statute:
[T]he purpose and direction underlying the provision are manifest
from its terms: proceedings in the state courts should be free from
interference by federal injunction. The provision expresses on its
face the duty of "hands off" by the federal courts in the use of the
injunctions to stay litigation in a state court. 28
In 1948, however, Congress restored the relitigation exception when
it adopted the anti-injunction statute in its present form. As revised, the
statute provided:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect
or effectuate its judgments.
29
Apparently the words "to protect or effectuate its judgments" were ex-
pressly included in order to restore the "relitigation" exception." °
In a recent case, 31 the Court held that the anti-injunction statute
was an absolute prohibition against interference with state court proceedings
unless an injunction was sought under one of the three exceptions. The
Court emphasized that the statute imposed a "binding rule on the power
of the federal courts" and rejected a contention that it established a mere
"principle of comity. ' ' 32
Prior to the instant case, the Supreme Court had not directly con-
fronted the question of whether the Civil Rights Act of 1871 fell within
the expressly authorized exception to the anti-injunction statute. As a
cannot reasonably impute such a purpose to Congress from the general language
of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 alone.
Id. at 225-26.
In NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971), the Leiter rationale was
extended to permit a federal administrative agency to obtain an injunction of a state
court proceeding. The Court considered irrelevant the fact that the moving party
was a federal agency, rather than the United States itself. Id. at 145-46. The Court
reasoned that it could not reasonably impute to Congress, by means of section 2283,
a purpose of frustrating the "superior federal interest" in regulating labor relations.
Id. at 246.
27. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
28. Id. at 132.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
30. The Reviser's Note to section 2283 states in pertinent part:
The exceptions specifically include the words "to protect or effectuate its
judgments," for lack of which the Supreme Court held that the Federal courts
are without power to enjoin relitigation of cases and controversies fully adju-
dicated by such courts. ...
Therefore the revised section restores the basic law as generally understood
and interpreted prior to the Toucy [sic] decision.
H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A181-82 (1947).
31. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S.
281 (1970).
32. Id. at 286.
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result, the lower courts were split with respect to this issue.33 In Dombrow-
ski v. Pfister,3 4 the Court held that the Civil Rights Act would authorize
a federal court injunction against threatened state criminal proceedings.
However, in Younger v. Harris,35 the Court set aside an injunction granted
under the Civil Rights Act against criminal proceedings pending in a
state court, but the holding was based upon a judicially imposed rule of
abstention and not upon the statutory prohibition.
It is important to note at this juncture that the Civil Rights Act of
1871 was the product of a reconstruction Congress and was adopted for
the express purpose of enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amend-
ment 6 as part of a basic alteration in the federal system developed by
the Congresses of that era.3 7  By this enactment, Congress sought to
counteract an effort within the states to deprive former slaves of the rights
secured to them by the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth amendments.38
The legislators believed that the state courts had failed to protect these
rights.39 They hoped that the federal courts, better insulated from local
influences, would prove to be more effective in guarding those rights
40
and, therefore, they created a civil remedy, enforceable in the federal courts,
for the redress of unconstitutional actions effected under color of state law.
In the words of one representative, the Act threw "open the doors of the
United States courts to those whose rights under the Constitutional [were]
denied or impaired."
4 1
As mentioned above, it was the intent of Congress in 1948 "to restore
the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucy
[sic] decision."' 42 However, the exceptions codified in 1948 did not accu-
rately reflect the case law prior to Toucey.43 In particular, some com-
33. Compare Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970), and Cooper v.
Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950), with Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d
579 (4th Cir. 1964) and Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963).
34. 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965).
35. 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).
36. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
37. Prior to 1875 the enforcement of most federal rights was left to the state
courts with the exception of occasional ad hoc grants of jurisdiction and the particular
specialties of federal jurisdiction. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman
Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 518 (1955). The Removal Act of 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558
(28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-50 (1970)), and the general federal question provision Act of
Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)), were, as was the Civil
Rights Act, post-Civil War enactments.
38. CoN;. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1871) (remarks of Representative
Hoar).
39. Id. at 374 (remarks of Representative Lowe). Congress intended to remedy
not only the misconduct of the state courts, but also their impotence:
Proponents of the legislation noted that the state courts were being used to
harass and injure individuals, either because the state courts were powerless to
stop deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of
federally protected rights.
407 U.S. at 240.
40. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (remarks of Representative Coburn).
41. Id. at 376 (remarks of Representative Lowe).
42. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A181-82 (1947). See note 30 supra.
43. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS § 1372, at 300 (1969); Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between State and
Federal Courts, 32 U. CHr. L. REV. 471, 482 (1965).
[VOL. 18
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mentators had deemed the term "expressly authorized" to be an inaccurate
description of the statutory qualifications developed prior to Toucey.
44
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Mitchum Court did not focus on the
term "expressly" in developing the criteria for the exception. 41 It noted
that a statute need not expressly refer to the anti-injunction statute to
qualify as an exception ;46 none of the previously created exceptions had
contained such an express reference. 47 Moreover, the Court also stated
that it was not even necessary that a statute contain an express authorization
of the use of injunctive relief against a state court proceeding.48 The
inquiry was instead directed toward legislative intent. The Court held that:
The test . . . [was] whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a
federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity, could
be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court pro-
ceeding.
49
Applying this test to the Civil Rights Act, the Court concluded that
it was such an act as fell within the "expressly authorized" exception to
the anti-injunction statute.50 The Act was intended to protect against
judicial as well as legislative and executive misconduct. 51 Moreover, the
provision of the Act for suits in equity authorized injunctive relief where
necessary. 52 Finally, past decisions had indicated that in exceptional cir-
cumstances, only the use of injunctive relief against state court proceedings
could avoid great, immediate, and irreparable harm to a person's constitu-
tional rights.5 3 Hence, the Court decided that the Congress which had
enacted the Civil Rights Act had not contemplated that the remedy
provided would be emasculated by the prohibition of the anti-injunction
statute.
54
However, a recurrent theme in the earlier cases of the Court dealing
with the anti-injunction statute was that the Court should expand its
exceptions only in clear cases:
[S]ince the statutory prohibition against such injunctions in part rests
on the fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their
courts, the exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory
construction. Proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed
to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts,
44. See, e.g., Comment, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74
HARV. L. REv. 726, 737 (1961). The objection was that the earlier decisions had not
focused upon the express language of the statutes.
45. 407 U.S. at 237.
46. Id.
47. See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
48. 407 U.S. at 237. See notes 17, 19 & 23 supra.
49. 407 U.S. at 238.
50. Id. at 243.
51. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
52. 407 U.S. at 242.
53. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) ; Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908).
54. 407 U.S. at 242.
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with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and
ultimately this Court.5
In view of this policy, the instant decision is vulnerable to the criticism
that the "expressly authorized" exception could reasonably have been
construed more narrowly. Prior to Mitchum, one commentator had noted
that, unlike the Civil Rights Act, all of the previously created statutory
qualifications had evinced on their faces a congressional concern with
jurisdictional or procedural matters. 6 Indeed, all of the past exceptions
either reserved exclusive jurisdiction of certain types of controversies to
the federal courts or authorized the federal courts to enjoin proceedings
in the state courts.57 Another commentator had asserted that the Reviser's
position that the removal acts should have been classified under the
''necessary in aid of" jurisdiction exception indicated an intent that the
"expressly authorized" exceptions be limited to statutes which by their
express language authorized injunctions against state court proceedings;
on the other hand, statutes which granted exclusive jurisdiction over
certain types of controversies should fall within the "necessary in aid of"
jurisdiction exception. 8 So construed, the Civil Rights Act, containing
only a general provision for suits in equity, would not have been considered
within the "expressly authorized" exception or the "necessary in aid of"
jurisdiction exception.
However, the offsetting advantage of the test of the "expressly
authorized" exception developed by the Mitchum Court is that it focuses
upon the intention of Congress, rather than upon express language. This
approach avoids the criticism that the Court is engaging in mere judicial
improvisation and ignoring the express congressional commands of the
anti-injunction statute. By requiring an examination of the legislative
history of the statute being analyzed under the test, it requires a deference
to the will of Congress. Moreover, it provides a more accurate gauge of
the scope of the remedy intended to be embodied in the statute than
would a more restrictive test. This advantage is clearly manifested in the
case at hand. A more restrictive test would have barred injunctive relief,
thus producing, as Justice Douglas noted in his dissent in Younger v.
Harris,50 an illogical result:
There is no more good reason for allowing a general statute dealing
with federalism passed at the end of the 18th century to control another
statute also dealing with federalism, passed almost 80 years later, than
to conclude that the early concepts of federalism were not changed
by the Civil War.60
55. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
287 (1970).
56. Developments in the Law - Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1051 (1965).
57. See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
58. See Comment, supra note 43, at 489.
59. 401 U.S. 37, 58 (1971).
60. Id. at 62.
[VOL. 18
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In addition, it seems unlikely that any needless friction between the
state and federal courts will be created by the Mitchum decision. Other
recent decisions of the Court have evinced a marked contraction of the
circumstances in which injunctive relief against state criminal proceedings
is permissible. 61 In addition to the normal equity requirement of proof
of severe, immediate, and irreparable harm, and the lack of an adequate
remedy at law,6 2 the Court in Younger, emphasizing a policy of federalism
which requires a "sensitivity to the legitimate interests" of state govern-
ments, 63 enunciated a more restrictive standard for the use of an injunction
against a criminal proceeding in a state court: an injunction is impermissible
unless (1) the state law involved is "flagrantly and patently violative of
express constitutional prohibitions,"6 4 or (2) the state prosecution is being
conducted in bad faith and with little hope of ultimate success to harass
the defendants in the exercise of constitutionally secured rights.65 Since
it is difficult to imagine what legitimate interest could justify a state in
continuing a criminal prosecution in such circumstances, the Mitchum
holding will not result in any objectionable intrusion upon the sovereignty
of the state courts in the area of criminal prosecutions. In this connection
the Mitchum Court, in remanding the case, was careful to note that it
did not question or qualify in any way the principles that should restrain
a federal court when asked to enjoin state court proceedings.6 6
The Mitchum Court has imposed some order in a previously confusing
area of the law by enunciating the criteria of the "expressly authorized"
exception to the anti-injunction statute. Although the exception thus
defined may be criticized as unnecessarily broad, the test does seem to be
reasonable as well as workable. By making the intended scope of a
statutory remedy the critical factor in determining whether it falls within
the exception, the Mitchum test makes the effectuation of the congressional
purpose more likely than would a test which focused solely upon the
express language of a statute.
However, it should be noted that the Mitchum decision does represent
a significant intrusion of the judiciary into the legislative area. The
Mttchurn test in certain cases will be more than a mere guide to statutory
interpretation or construction, and will permit the judicial improvisation
decried by Justice Frankfurter in the Toucey case. As in the instant case,
where the legislative history of a statute reveals no consideration by Con-
gress of its relation to the anti-injunction statute, the determination of
whether it falls within the "expressly authorized" exception is left to the
courts. Whether the courts should have the power to define the scope
of a congressional limitation upon their powers is questionable. However,
61. See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
62. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
63. 401 U.S. at 43.
64. Id. at 53.
65. Id. at 54.
66. 407 U.S. at 243.
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it should be remembered that this judicial legislation was required by the
inadequacy of the congressional attempt in 1948 to define the scope of
the exceptions.
While previously developed principles of abstention seem to assure
that there will be no flood of unwarranted intrusions into the state courtsR6
Mitchum should assure that the anti-injunction statute will not thwart
federal injunctive relief in those exceptional cases where such relief is
truly required.
Kenneth I. Levin
67. Justices Stewart and Harlan, in a concurring opinion in Younger, indicated
that federal courts might be more likely to intervene in state civil proceedings than
in criminal proceedings:
Courts of equity have traditionally shown greater reluctance to intervene in
criminal prosecutions than in civil cases. . . . The offense to state interests is
likely to be less in a civil proceeding. A State's decision to classify conduct as
criminal provides some indication of the importance it has ascribed to prompt
and unencumbered enforcement of its law. By contrast, the State might not
even be a party in a proceeding under a civil statute.
401 U.S. at 55 n.2.
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